Text analyzes in detail legal situation dealing with the Czech government investiture vote. Constitutional foundations are tested against political practice, which is oft en quite diff erent. Th e Results confi rms the construction of investiture vote is less important that notorious weakness of the government majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
Introduction
Th e Czech Republic, established in 1993 as one of the successors of the former Czechoslovakia, is a relatively young state. It of course also belongs to the group of post-communist countries, which had been under the dominance of communist party for 40 years , which prohibited any development of democratic instruments. On the other hand, unlike many other Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, it could have built on the experience with regime between World Wars, which was praised by numerous at that time (but contemporary as well!) experts as one of the most modern democratic political systems in Europe. Th e positive example of the First Republic , together with the relatively advanced economy, were probably the main reasons that contributed to the successful transformation of the Czech Republic to a democratic state with a market economy. Surely there have been numerous glitches and drawbacks on the way, but generally speaking the journey was more straightforward than in the other countries of Central (not to say Eastern) Europe.
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From a political viewpoint the Czech Republic is a very interesting case. It is a unitary state with a classic parliamentary political system. Th e legislative power is represented by bicameral parliament. While both chambers are selected by direct vote, the lower chamber (Chamber of Deputies) serves as the real powerhouse, the upper one (Senate) has only a moderating function.
3 Asymmetry between chambers is confi rmed by the legislature-executive relations, as the Constitution proclaims that government is responsible only to the Chamber of Deputies. Th e President is selected indirectly by the Parliament, but at the same time his role is far from ceremonial (see below). Th e Chamber of Deputies is elected by a proportional system with modifi ed D´Hondt formula, the threshold is set to 5 %.
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While there is nothing exceptional in this outline, the practical functioning of the system is unusual. With a pinch of salt, we could describe it as simultaneously highly stable and unstable. Th e fi rst pattern is represented by the main actors. First, so far the Czech Republic had only two presidents: Václav Havel (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and Václav Klaus (since 2003), their position has been even stronger than the Constitution would suggest. Among the political parties, the left -wing social democrats (ČSSD) and right-wing civic democrats (ODS) have consistently been by far the strongest political parties, followed by communists (KSČM) and several smaller centre-right parties (eg. Christian democrats -KDÚ-ČSL). Here comes the instability factor. Due to the proportional system, no party was ever been able to gain an absolute majority of votes, which means coalitions need to be formed. ODS and ČSSD are fi erce ideological rivals and although there were moments when big coalitions were considered, it never (openly) happened. In light of this and the fact that KSČM is intentionally left out of any coalition negotiations by both main parties, the possible win set for majoritarian government is indeed quite small and in reality could be reached only with the aid of those few centre-right parties that side either with ČSSD (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) or ODS (1993-1998, 2006-2009, since 2010) . Th e winning coalition has usually been able to hold a miniscule majority in the Chamber of Deputies, sometimes only with the help of deputies that changed their allegiance (so called "přeběhlík" / crossrunner ).
Th e vote of investiture is without doubts an important part of the government formation process in many countries, while at the same time the amount of literature devoted to the topic is quite negligible. Th e ambition of the presented article is to provide an empirical case study of the process and impact of the investiture vote in the Czech Republic. At fi rst sight, single case-studies are less useful than comparative papers covering many countries. On the other hand, the rules of the investiture vote and their application are so diverse that any comparison is naturally but a schematic one, in this case a detailed discussion of one country's experience might be valuable as well. Th e vote of investiture in the Czech Republic follows a positive parliamentarism pattern.
5 Given the background sketched in the previous paragraph, the Czech Republic underwent a wide variety of situations including minority and caretaker governments. In order to form a government, the politicians were forced to "invent" numerous innovative instruments that modifi ed or broadened the constitutional rules. Description of these mechanisms and analysis of their effi ciency might shed some light not only on the Czech situation, but also serve as a comparative basis for other states' practice or possible amendment of their own rules. Th e article deals only with the obligatory vote of investiture faced by new governments, not the voluntary ones (vote of confi dence) the ruling governments sometimes decide to endure for various reasons.
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Apart from the introduction, this article is divided into four parts. Th e second chapter describes the formal rules dealing with the process of government formation both in Constitutional and ordinary laws, including several problematic black spots in the Czech legal order. Th e subsequent part forms the core of the text and analyses practical experience with government formation with the emphasis on the vote of investiture. It is divided into three subsections; the fi rst concentrates on the preliminary phase characterized by the importance of the President, then there is an interim explanation how the Czech governments were able to obtain support in practice and fi nally I move onto the closing phase in the Chamber of Deputies. As some political parties or experts were dissatisfi ed with the functioning of the present system, various reforms were off ered, these are discussed in part four. Th e Conclusion assesses the Czech experience and tries to ascertain if the vote of investiture forms a deciding factor in the Czech political system, fi nally a short comparison is made to the situation in other states. 
Constitutional framework
Th e formal process of government formation in the Czech Republic is relatively straightforward; the necessary rules are given in Art. 68 of the Constitution (see below). As I already said, it is a clear example of positively formulated formation rules, if we use a more detailed classifi cation of Lieven De Winter, than it belongs to the group of "weakest positive", 7 because a simple majority is suffi cient to gain confi dence. When I pointed out the importance of the First Republic legacy for the Czech Constitution, it is worthy to note that in this case the tradition was breached. Th e Constitution from 1920 prescribed the negative formation rules, 8 which was exploited for the formation of non-political governments.
9 Th e investiture vote was introduced by the fi rst Communist constitution from 1948, 10 the constitution from 1960 dismissed any notion of the division of powers and established the dominance of the National Assembly, so the duty for the government to undergo investiture vote was implicitly still there.
11 Of course, it was the Communist Party that held all the power and therefore practically it hardly mattered. Aft er the Velvet Revolution in 1989 numerous parts of the 1960 Constitution were changed, but the vote of investiture procedure remained. During the draft ing of the Constitution of the new Czech Republic, there was no real discussion on the issue, return to negative rule of the First Republic was probably rejected on the basis of the mentioned undesirable eff ects which lead to periods of instability.
12 Th e subsequent part describes and analyses the outline of the process. 3. Within thirty days aft er its appointment the Government shall present itself to the Chamber of Deputies and shall ask it for a vote of confi dence. 4. If a newly appointed Government fails to win the confi dence of the Chamber of Deputies, the procedure specifi ed in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be followed. If a thus appointed Government again fails to win the confi dence of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Republic shall appoint a Prime Minister on the proposal of the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies. 5. In other cases the President of the Republic shall appoint and recall on the proposal of the Prime Minister the other members of the Government and shall entrust them with the direction of ministries or other agencies. Art. 68 para 2 to 4 is applicable to all government formations, both aft er the general elections or in case the actual government resigns. Th e fi rst step is entrusted to the President, who appoints the Prime Minister (PM). It is her of his autonomous decision not dependent on any proposal, he 14 does not need a co-signature from the government.
15 Th e President's free hand is strengthened by the fact that he is constitutionally irresponsible and there are no time limits set for the selection. Indeed, the only legal limits of his behaviour are rather a vague proclamation in the President's oath, 16 he must also respect the pluralism of political parties (see Art. 5 Const.). In light of this, the decision is not entirely arbitrary, 17 not to speak about the political dimension of the question (see further).
Aft er the appointment the PM (in waiting) forms his government, now it is him who is not restrained by any rules, indeed the text of the Constitution does not (nor any other laws) put any limit on the number of ministers or their qualifi cation, apart from the obvious ones.
18 Th e role of President in the appointment of ministers is hotly debated. Th e strictest interpretation claims he is bound by the proposal of the PM and simply confi rms his decision, 19 according to the intermediate version he could only review legal issues such as incompatibility of 14 As Czech politics is (unfortunately) predominantly male environment, I will use only "he" or "his" throughout the text. 15 Czech Constitution divides the President's competences into two groups: those that need to be confi rmed by the signature of the PM (see Art. 63 para 1 Const.) and those that are his "own" (see Art. 62 Const.). In this case even practically it would hardly be logical to require PM's signature (the leaving one? the newly appointed one?). 16 "…I shall perform my offi ce in the interest of all the people…" (Art. 59 para 2 Const. 21 I personally tend to agree with the second view, but the whole issue remains so far mainly theoretical as the PM did not propose anybody too controversial. What is more important is the timeframe of the appointment process. Although the Constitution does not prohibit the appointment of the PM and his government in one moment, a two step procedure is more likely. Th is enforces the PM by giving him time space to negotiate his team and prepare for the showdown in the Chamber of Deputies. Th e question is for how long this space should be. Th eoretically it is unlimited and the PM could even artifi cially prolong it when the bulk of government is already formed, 22 on the other hand he is at this point not a proper PM, the actual executive powers are still held by the previous (leaving) government. Th e Czech Constitution thus does not preclude a period with two legitimate PMs, no matter how undesirable this state of aff airs is.
By the offi cial appointment of the government starts the 30 day deadline, during which the government has to ask for the vote of investiture. However the situation is more complicated aft er elections than the Constitution would suggest. According to the Chamber of Deputies Rules of Procedure (RP), the fi rst session aft er elections is so called the "founding" one with a fi xed programme such as the selection of its own leadership or committees.
23 Th e vote of investiture could be placed on the agenda of regular session only, which might not start sooner than the founding one is closed. It is therefore not inconceivable that the government will be appointed during the founding session, but it would be a risky step because the deadline could run out in vain.
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If the government is rightly appointed (and the founding session concluded), the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies has a duty to place the vote of investiture on the agenda in order to meet the 30 days deadline (Art. 82 para 2 RP). As was already said, a simple majority of the present deputies suffi ces. Because the lowest quorum is set to one third of the full house which consists of 200 deputies (Art. 70 para 1 RP), theoretically the government could win the investiture with the active support of only 34 deputies. If the government survives the investiture vote, it gained confi dence and might proceed to perform its task as a "fully legitimate" executive.
Art. 68 para 4 Const. deals with situation when the appointed government fails to win the investiture vote. Firstly it must resign (Art. 73 para 2 Const.), if the government hesitates, the President will dismiss it himself (Art. 75 Const.). Th en the whole process described above is repeated with the hope that the President will be more luck in his second choice and the Chamber of Deputies will be more conciliatory. If the expectations are not fulfi lled, the third PM is again appointed by the President, but this time on the proposal from the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies.
25 Th e logic of this solution is based on the assumption that the chairman should be more knowledgeable with the situation in the Chamber of Deputies than the President and his choice will have more chances to succeed. I fi nd numerous objections against this reasoning, namely that the chairman's decision is based simply on his personal wishes and therefore does not have to be based on the opinion of the Chamber's majority. If even the third attempt fails the President has a right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies (Art. 35 para 1 let. a) Const.), which might serve as a motivation to deputies to act more "positively". Th e Constitution does not foresee a situation in which the Chamber is not dissolved in this case, I guess a logical interpretation indicates there will be a new third attempt by the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies.
A more detailed analysis of the abovementioned procedure will reveal many loose ends, but these are rather pet objects of hardcore constitutional jurists and therefore out of article's reach. Still there are two open issues that require closer inspection. Th e fi rst of them is the problem of what would happen if the appointed government misses the 30 days deadline and will not ask for the vote of investiture. Th e Constitution does not anticipate it and the situation is not specifi cally mentioned as a reason for obligatory government resignation in Art. 73 para 2 Const.
26 Some experts 27 infer from the text's silence that actually there are negative rules of government formation in the Czech Republic and the appointed government may fully perform its duties unless the Chamber of Deputies forces it to resign by a vote of no-confi dence.
28 It must be said such views are in absolute minority and despite the fact that the deadline is only formal, all noticeable lawyers in the Czech Republic argue that failure to ask for investiture represents 25 Th is mechanism is somewhat similar to standard procedure in Sweden. 26 Th erefore the President is also not entitled to dismiss the government. a grave constitutional off ence which was simply out of the Constitution's draft ers imagination.
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Th e last point requiring discussion is the issue when exactly the government has to undergo the vote of investiture. Clearly it concerns the governments aft er elections and the successors of governments forced to resign aft er the vote of no-confi dence. But what about other cases, such as major reconstruction of the government? Although the Constitution lacks any leads, the question revolves around the position of the PM. One group of scholars argue he is the central element of any government, if he resigns, a new government must be appointed and ask for the investiture vote. Reversely, if the PM remains in offi ce he is able to replace even all ministers or change the parties in the coalition. Th is position is based on the notion that there could hardly exist a government without its head and on the interpretation of Art. 68 Const., which seems not to allow the appointment of a new PM by other means than those described above.
30 Opponents claim total dependence of government on the PM is inconvenient and unfair, what if he simply dies or resigns because of his personal failure? Is it not suffi cient then to simply appoint a new PM rather than undergo the cumbersome process of old government resignation and new government formation? Th eoretically this opinion is based on the notion that the Czech government is a collective body (see Art. 76 para 1 Const.) and the PM is only primus inter partes, there is no tradition of a Chancellor system as in Germany.
31 Practice has tended to develop towards the fi rst position.
Vote of investiture in practice 32
Th e fi rst Czech government came to offi ce on 1 st January 1993. Th e Constitution directly declared (Art. 108) that it did not have to undergo the regular appointment process, because it was the successor of the government of the Czech Republic (as part of Czechoslovakia), appointed aft er the general elections in 1992. Because this government ruled for the rest of the full election period, it was not until aft er the 1996 elections the fi rst government formation process took place. Since then, ten governments have undergone thevote of investiture, fi ve of them following new elections. Out of the ten, there were three minority governments and two caretaker (half-political) ones, so we have quite a varied sample (see table in the annex). Surely there are certain diff erences between formations of each type of government, but as I want to point out only the interesting points, all instances will be tended together, with the emphasis on the post-election process.
Introductory phase: Role of the President
Czech politics has little experience with pre-election coalitions or presentations of promises with whom each party wants to govern. Politicians aim to increase their share against all competitors; even those ideologically close, and always justify their silence by saying that "only the voter will decide how the next government will look". Conversely , they rather stress with whom they will never form a government, oft en the mutual incompatibility among parties is so complex it would seem there is mathematically no chance for any government, barring the unlikely gain of majority for one party. In light of this and numerous previous breaches of such "never" vows "forced" by electoral results, nobody takes them seriously.
Th e informal negotiations among parties typically start the minute the fi rst predictions of results are made public. In 2006 or 2010, ODS together with smaller center-right parties very swift ly announced agreement on future cooperation in government, but the fi rst offi cial move must be made by the President. As was emphasized above, so far the Czech Republic has experienced only two persons in this offi ce. Both Havel and Klaus had a very strong position and acted actively during the negotiations. Th e major diff erence between them was their political affi liation -while Havel was traditionally non-partisan, Klaus used to be a long-term chairman of ODS. On the other hand, he did not like his successor Mirek Topolánek, therefore there was hardly any positive bias towards this party. AnOther important factor in Klaus's behaviour proceeded from his previous experience: when Klaus's second government was forced to resign in 1997, he strongly criticized the course of action Havel chose and labelled his steps as activist, there were aft erwards even eff orts to constitutionally curb the President's powers (see below). When Klaus later acquired presidential offi ce, he indicated he would have a more passive attitude in these situations.
Despite the opportunity to appoint whoever they want, both President's course of action was traditionally careful and refl ected the electoral results. It means that in almost all cases it was the leader of the strongest party in the Chamber of Deputies who was the entrusted initiative. Several times he was not directly appointed, but asked (formally -see the table, or informally) to start the negotiations. Th e role of informateur is not constitutionally sanctioned and sometimes it is critized because it prolongs the whole procedure (there is no time limit) and strengthens the President, who is not risking forfeiting his fi rst offi cial nomination.
33 He could also lay conditions to the informateur, an activity 34 Such an obligation constitutionally does not make sense, because fi rst it changes the required simple majority to absolute one, secondly the deputies have a free mandate and any signature does not bind them to vote accordingly. Still Gross complied. Similar conditions were laid on Mirek Topolánek in 2006, however this was further complicated by the added requirement that there should be no cross runners.
35 As the Chamber was divided 100:100 and the opposition represented by ČSSD and KSČM, the only solution to Klaus's wish would be great coalition of ODS and ČSSD. In this case it was Klaus who relented. In spite of the mentioned doubtful practises, the informateur's phase is generally accepted and slowly has become a constitutional custom.
36 Both presidents were usually heavily involved in the negotiations, asked informateurs for regular reporting on their progress, invited the leaders of political parties for conversations or even organized common meetings when deadlock was looming. At the same time they however pretended to be "above" the quarrels and did not comment on their personal attitudes.
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Aft er the successful conclusion of informal negotiations by informateur , Th e President appoints the PM. One might think that Th e President has more room for manoeuvre during the formation of caretaker governments, which during the First Republic were basically selected solely by the head of state. But as the Constitution requires a similar vote of investiture for any government, even in these cases there must be an agreement of political parties and in the past they have informally made it known who were acceptable candidates for the caretaker PM. Apart from caretaker governments, the only exception to the "leader of the strongest party=appointed PM" rule was in 2010, when the post was entrusted to Petr Nečas as the chairman of the second most successful party (ODS). Although the previous custom was broken, it was no arbitrary behaviour from the President, because ODS had already negotiated support from two other parties and with a common majority of 118 deputies, there was no chance of success for any other confi guration.
Only aft er the 2006 elections the President had to progress to the second round of the PM's appointment, because his fi rst choice, Mirek Topolánek, was lidovky.cz/texty/rs521.html (visited on 14th July 2011). 34 Originally Klaus indicated that a majority of 102-105 deputies will be needed. not able to gain enough support for his team in the vote of investiture. Aft er prolonged negotiations, during which the leader of second strongest party (ČSSD) Jiří Paroubek demanded his turn, Klaus again opted for Topolánek. Although the Constitution does not directly proscribe such a step, the decision was considered controversial by many. Th e general viewpoint is that it would be logical and fair to give a chance to somebody else, 38 A well-known constitutional lawyer from the First Republic even claimed President is not allowed to name a person that was forced to resign.
39 Th eoretically it sounds fool proof, practical politics however does not always follow the blueprint: at that point Topolánek was able to lure two deputies from ČSSD and therefore had the needed majority. On the other hand it does not mean the President´s attitude did not have any impact, had Paroubek been given a nod, it is not unlikely he would be able to persuade somebody else from the other camp to gain the vote he required.
Aft er the PM is appointed, the role of the President is diminishing. With the exception of Václav Klaus, who (with no impact) raised objections against nomination of Karel Schwarzenberg to the post of Foreign Minister, 40 presidents left a free hand to the PMs in selection of ministers, the governments as a whole were duly appointed once the teams were complete. At the beginning Václav Havel came to the Chamber of Deputies before the vote of investiture, defended the governments appointed by him and asked the deputies to support them, but aft er 1998 he ceased to do that and Klaus has never considered it.
Interim explanation: How to create a "majority" in the Czech Republic
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Th e appointed government requires the support of the majority of deputies in order to overcome the vote of investiture. Given the usually complicated situation in the Chamber of Deputies, resulting from irreconcilability of some subjects and the balance between left -wing and right-wing political parties, it could be indeed very diffi cult to succeed. How were the politicians able to overcome the hurdle? I will provide a brief historical sketch fi rst. Sometimes circumstances predestined the results. In 1996, the parties of ruling coalition received only 98 votes, but the remaining 102 votes were divided among ČSSD, KSČM and extreme right-wing Republicans. Th ese parties were too diverse to form a coalition, and as the governing parties rejected to cooperate with anybody else, the only other option than minority government was new elections. ČSSD assessed its options and preferred to act as "constructive" opposition, which meant its deputies left the chamber during the vote of investiture. Later the balance shift ed thanks the fi rst occurrence of cross runners, still Klaus' government resigned prematurely because of internal disputes. Th e subsequent caretaker government of Tošovský ruled for only few months and won the investiture vote on a promise of early elections.
Elections in 1996 were won by ČSSD, which proposed a coalition to centerright parties and even off ered a post of PM to them. Th ey rejected, and the coalition between those parties and ODS was impossible due to personal hatred caused by the government's downfall in 1997. Surprisingly, ODS and ČSSD were able to close the so called "Opposition agreement", according to its text ODS tolerated social democratic government and promised not to initiate or vote for a vote of no-confi dence. In return they received the position of Chamber of Deputies chairman for Klaus and together both parties planned to adapt the Constitution (see below) and change the electoral system to the majoritarian formula.
42 Despite grave minority, the government was able to rule quite successfully for the whole period. While many Czech intellectuals criticized the arrangement as a simple division of power that breached any democratic standards, 43 foreign commentators evaluated it through more pragmatic lenses.
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In 2002 ČSSD won again, this time the same center-right parties agreed to a coalition which mastered the slightest majority of 101 deputies. Th e coalition survived for the whole period, however internal problems in its biggest member party meant three PMs took offi ce in four years and due to abovementioned practice, a new investiture vote had to be organized each time, although both the composition of the coalition and even the majority of ministers remained the same. Th ere were deputies crossing allegiance on both sides, somehow the government always had the upper hand.
Th e most diffi cult situation was aft er the 2006 elections. Parties positioned on the right side of the spectrum immediately announced an agreement, but they had only 100 deputies. A deadlock loomed, politicians were even not able to agree on the establishment of the Chamber's leadership, partly because any concession would be taken as a gesture of weakness, secondly because of the role the chairman plays during third attempt to appoint the PM. As was also explained, if the founding session is not fi nished, no appointment of new government could take place. In the end a low-fi gure deputy from ČSSD was elected as chairman based on a public promise he would step down before he had a chance to nominate the PM. Still this did not solve the governments' conundrum. Finally Klaus appointed Topolánek, but he still commanded only 100 votes. Th erefore his advisers invented an interpretation that a tie during the vote of investiture is actually suffi cient, but this crazy theory was rejected even by some of the ODS deputies. Finally Topolánek gambled and formed an ODS minority government with a promise that new elections will be organized soon. Opposition rejected the off er, Paroubek still hoped he would receive his chance in the second round (see above), yet Klaus opted for Topolánek again and his second attempt lead to a successful outcome thanks to the two cross runners.
Disputes within the ODS and the smallest coalition party (Greens) caused the premature end of this government in 2009, and again a caretaker government consisted of minor politicians was installed with the purposed to lead the country to early elections. But as these were annulled by the Constitutional Court, this government remained in offi ce until the regular date of election in June 2010. Once more a close result was expected, but while ČSSD won, amazingly the right-wing parties received 118 mandates and for the fi rst time in the history of the Czech Republic were able to form government without diffi culties. 
Closing phase: Chamber of deputies steps in
Once the role of President is over, the responsibility turns to the hands of deputies in the Chamber. Th e chairman sets the date of the investiture vote, usually it is the only agenda for the day. Th e question arises what exactly one means by the "confi dence". Chamber of Deputies only proclaims in its resolution that "government gained confi dence". As the government has hardly done anything yet, the deputies are not able to assess its real activities such as in the case of noconfi dence vote.
46 But, in a political system based on the competition of political parties, confi dence is best expressed as the support for a political programme representing the compromise agreed among the coalition parties.
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Even before the government is appointed, its member parties oft en conclude a coalition agreement which is endorsed by the parties' structure. Th e coalition agreement however usually dedicates a large part of space to internal working mechanisms of the coalition and allocation of seats in the executive rather than programmatic aims. Th e intentions of future government are thus described in detail in its programme. In Czechoslovakia government's programme was an obligatory part of the investiture vote.
48 Contemporary Constitution dropped the requirement, still all governments prepared the programme and it has already become a constitutional custom. Th e 30 days window between the appointment and vote of investiture might be viewed as time for preparation of the programme. It is not easy to make any generalizations about these texts. Caretaker governments tend to issue the shortest documents (see table in annex), 45 Since July 2010, this government has been on the verge of internal breakout several times, but that is for another story. but (political) the government of Topolánek I. and Paroubek were also supposed to rule only for about a year and still they submitted above average texts. One would expect that the fewer parties in government, the shorter the text as compromises theoretically tend to prolong any agreement, but the correlation is not there. It is clear the texts are not mere proclamations and oft en contained very detailed prescription of planned activities, in this they served more as a binding contracts to the coalition (and supporting deputies) rather than tools aiming to persuade the opposition.
During Czechoslovak times, the programme was fi rst read by the PM during the investiture vote. In 1996 the coalition wished to continue the tradition and tried to reject the demand of ČSSD to provide it in advance, but had to yield and submitted it to all parties several hours before the vote. On the other hand, PM Zeman in 1998 provided the programme to the deputies in advance and said it would be useless to read it. His successor Špidla also had the text printed out, but undaunted proceeded to read the whole 50 pages to an almost empty chamber. Subsequent governments did not establish any pattern, again some of them even tried to keep it secret until the vote. Th is attitude could be explained by the fact that if the government counts on tacit support of any party, revealing the programme might lead to another round of concession requests, while the presentation during the vote leave no time for manoeuvre. But if the (tacit or direct) support is really needed, the programme might refl ect the agreements with objects outside the government, case in point is the Opposition Agreement. In 2006 Topolánek included parts of the written agreement he made with the cross runners, ČSSD supported the caretaker government in 1998 only aft er the Chamber itself adopted a resolution that the Social Democrats conditions on new government will be met.
Th e presentation of programme (if it is read) is followed by debate. Although it could hardly change the result of the vote, it is traditionally a high point of the Chamber's life, also because it is transmitted live on TV. Usually dozens of deputies are rotating behind the lectern and the debate continues for many hours (see table in annex). Again there is little that could be deduced from the process. Data confi rms that generally the length of debates has slightly decreased over time and the more controversial the formation of the government was, the longer the debate. In practice the whole endeavour is debated only by name, because the majority of deputies prefer to read their prepared speeches, the bulk of time is taken by the parties leaders. Obviously opposition is more active, but coalition is involved as well, the exception being the last government of Nečas, which left the opposition to speak with no interference from coalition deputies.
Aft er the conclusion of the debate a vote is taken. In light of the slight majorities in the Chamber in the past, each deputy was important. Th at caused numerous problems as naturally not all deputies were healthy enough to participate. Traditionally this situation is solved (not only during the vote of investiture, but any vote) by the so-called pairing, an informal process when excused deputy of the opposition is counterbalanced by a deputy from the ruling parties (or vice versa) who intentionally does not vote. Th is system is conventional for both sides, as it is impossible to maintain full participation throughout the whole election period. But sometimes the tempers during the investiture vote were so bad that the opposition rejected pairing, arguing that the expected tragic consequences of the new government prevailed over moral issues. Th erefore, the viewers had to experience disturbing pictures of seriously ill deputies taken from the hospital with great risks just to vote. Voting is taken by names, when each deputy has to stand up and clearly express himself.
49 "For proposal" means support for government, "against proposal" opposition, everything else is taken as abstention. Amusing situations happened, for example in 2006 social democratic deputy answered "I am against proposal", which had to qualify as abstention.
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Th e votes are counted by the registrars, a brief break is taken and aft er that the (already well-known) results are announced. If confi dence is proclaimed, new government gained legitimacy and might fully immerse in its duties.
Proposals for reform
Th e rules dealing with the process of government formation has remained the same since the adoption of the Constitution. But there were several proposals how to reform the mechanisms. Few concentrated on the streamlining of steps, namely by introducing fi xed deadlines. Each time instability in the Chamber of Deputies occurred, arguments for positive impact of constructive veto of no confi dence were raised. But these ideas were only tentative and never made it to the legislative proposals, although the constructive veto has become part of the latest government programme.
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Th e only proposal discussed in the Parliament was the one tabled in 1999 by ODS and ČSSD during the times of the Opposition Agreement.
52 It planned to amend numerous parts of the Constitution, including the process of government formation. Th e core of the adaptations in this area concerned the initial phase, namely the role of the President. According to the new rules, aft er the elections he had to ask the representative of the strongest party to propose him the composition of a government within a 30 day limit. If his request was not accepted or the appointed government did not win the vote of investiture, the representative of the second party with most mandates had its turn. An unsuccessful result would move the baton to the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, who had seven days to choose a citizen, who would be asked by the President to compose 49 See Art. 85 para 1 RP. Th e name of the starting deputy is taken by draw. 50 It had no impact on the result, as Topolánek had two crossrunners. Th e "confused" deputy later also became crossrunner, so maybe his mistake was intentional. a government in ten days. In case the vote of investiture failed for the third time, the Chamber had to be dissolved by the President. Similar rules applied when government resigned or was voted out between elections, only the limits for the selection of governments were reduced to ten days. In all cases the appointed government had to undergo the vote of investiture in 15 days.
Clearly the amendment aimed to reduce the scope of President's discretion and made him basically just a notary initiating prescribed parts of the script. Secondly, the position of informateur was constitutionalized, he or she would have the option to choose the PM and ministers, because the whole team would be appointed together. Th irdly, new deadlines were introduced and the existing ones were shortened.
Proposing parties defended the changes by claiming that the amendment "only introduces mechanisms commonly self-evident in parliamentary democracies", but without any concrete references. 53 Realistically it was obvious they wish to limit the role of President Havel, who strongly criticized the Opposition Agreement and personally intervened into the solution of the government's crisis in 1997-1998. One of the proposal's authors openly admitted that there was need to reduce the space for the "subjective attitude of the President". 54 In practice, both ČSSD and ODS expected one of them would always be the strongest party in the foreseeable future, therefore the rules could have guaranteed them fi rst formation turns for a long time.
55
Th e proposal was successfully adopted by the Chamber of Deputies, but it was unable to obtain the necessary constitutional majority in the Senate, where ČSSD and ODS did not command enough votes. Senators also condemned the content of the changes, arguing that it is an attempt "to constrain in useless detail situations which are … easier to solve by heeding to relatively free manoeuvring space of each constitutional institution. "
56 Numerous experts criticized the amendment as well, disproving it with historic, logical and comparative arguments. 57 With a chance of hindsight, I could say that if the proposal is applied on the real situations in the last ten years, it would have brought similar results in the majority of cases, but rather damaging eff ects in others, while any possible positive impact would be hard to fi nd.
Conclusion and comparative snapshot
Positively formulated investiture rules are nowadays deeply entrenched in the Czech constitutional culture and apart from few eccentric experts (see above), nobody contradicts them. Generally speaking, three main advantages to negative rules are mentioned in relation to the procedure. Firstly there is a question of legitimacy. Th e Constitution says that all power stems from the people (Art. 2 para 1 Const.). Th e President is elected indirectly by the Parliament. Had negative rules suffi ced and the government would base its position only from the head of state, the link to the people would be simply too weak. Secondly, positive rules should contribute to eff ective administration of the state. Th e vote of investiture confi rms the government is able to command enough deputies in the Chamber in order to force it will and ideally to fulfi l the promises the coalition parties gave to the (majority) of the voters. Finally, it balances the power relations within the executive, that is between the government and the President. If the latter knows the PM appointed by him must have support in the Chamber, he is bound to choose wisely and should not pursue his own political agenda.
It is diffi cult to assess how the theoretical assumptions are converted into practice. Th e legitimacy link could hardly be questioned, as in Czech politics the Chamber maintains a strong position vis a vis other institutions, to base the power only on the head of state would hardly be acceptable. Th e Eff ectiveness of the government provides however a much bleaker picture. Th e miniscule majorities the governments usually had meant that while they were able to scrap enough votes for the investiture, this did not necessarily happen for the regular votes on acts or other issues. It is diffi cult to lead a country if each coalition's deputy knows he or she has the decisive vote and blackmails the government accordingly. Th e role of the President was discussed above in detail, while there were occasions where both Havel and Klaus interpreted their rights somewhat extensively or even praeter constitutionem, all in all the decisions they took could hardly be labeled undemocratic or even unfair, despite all the critique. In this sense the threat of investiture indeed has a constraining impact on the President.
If we use the typology proposed by Kaare Strøm et al, 58 the Czech Republic is an example of a state in which the electoral results infl uence the government formation much more than the institutional constraints. Indeed the number of constraints are very limited and politicians are able (or must) to invent innovative ways out of the looming deadlock. Reconciliation between the biggest foes, sudden change of positions, violations of "unbreakable" promises, draft ing of opposing deputies by whatever means, that all was experienced with incessant lamenting of commentators on ever decreasing political morality. On the other 58 hand, maybe these instruments, despising as they might be, have contributed at least to the illusion externally that the Czech Republic has political stability.
As was explained in the introduction, while I deliberately omitted comparative insights in the article, at least a very brief sketch is limited to this closing paragraph. Each reader interested in comparison of various data with other CEE countries is kindly referred to articles by Zeynep Somer-Topcu together with Laron Williams 59 and by Courtenay Conrad with Sona Golder, 60 the length of government formation in Western European states is provided by Daniel Diermeier and Peter van Roozendaal. 61 Despite all the methodological diffi culties with measurements and the fact that the averages could change very quickly with the limited number of cases in new democracies, 62 it is quite obvious that the postelection government formation process has been much slower than in other both Western and CEE countries. We can thus confi rm the expected impact of positive investiture rules, exacerbated by oft en very close results of elections. In the case of Czech governments' stability the positive rules have helped as well. While at fi rst sight the duration of Czech governments is about average compared to CEE and shorter to Western Europe, 63 given the circumstances it is quite an unexpected result, and I even do not take into account that between 2002 and 2006 there was actually only one government, because everything remained the same but the PMs, who were replaced for intraparty reasons. On the other hand, not all theoretical hypotheses are confi rmed, for example the number of minority governments in the Czech Republic has been relatively high for positive rules. 
